Good will wasn’t enough in past attempts to separate NIS functions and keep them out of politics

By Kim Nam-il, staff reporter

“Surely you wouldn’t be afraid of being dragged into the National Intelligence Service (NIS) offices these days unlike in the past, would you? I don’t yet know how much to reform, or how to reform the agency, but if it continues to modify and adjust like now, then it’ll probably be fine without radical change. The NIS tends to be democratic as long as the president is democratic. Now, as unlike its previous history, the NIS would not conduct any bad actions on its own unless the president made the order to do so.”

This critical remark, which laid out the NIS’s path under the Lee Myung-bak government, was made in the middle of talk at the Blue House Reception Hall on March 23, 2006. It was part of then-President Roh Moo-hyun’s answer to ‘What kind of South Korea do you want your grandchildren to live in?’ during a televised discussion with members of the public.

The president’s remark came at the same time as the release of a classified National Security Agency (the NIS’s previous incarnation) file, as well as the imprisonment and indictment of two previous NIS chiefs for illegal wiretapping and surveillance. This urged politicians to propose NIS reforms over the next six months. But efforts at NIS reform dragged on without progress due to strong internal resistance from NIS.

At the beginning of his term, President Roh Moo-hyun declared plans for the most radical NIS reform in South Korean history. The proposed measures included separating responsibility for domestic and foreign intelligence, prohibiting the gathering of domestic intelligence, scrapping anti-communist investigation authority and imposing stricter standards on NIS budget management. President Roh’s good intentions were ultimately thwarted after he commented about making ‘good use of the intelligence services’.

It took only two years after Lee Myung-bak came to power to prove that Roh’s ‘good will’ to use the intelligence services for positive ends could not be a final solution. Experts suggest that the NIS is so big that it needs to be divided according to function and roles. There are also suggestions that the National Assembly should expand its control over the NIS and its budget. These options could be a good alternative to prevent repeated political interference by the NIS.

Many alternatives to prevent political interference by the NIS　

Among some experts and politicians, a gradual consensus has formed that the NIS must separate its intelligence gathering and distributing functions, which open the door to political interference by the NIS. This is closely linked to separation of functions: domestic intelligence, anti-North Korea intelligence, and foreign intelligence.

According to one source who was involved in NIS reform under the Roh administration, “At the beginning of Roh Moo-hyun’s term, Seo Dong-man, then NIS Planning & Coordination Director, took the initiative to push for NIS reform. But it was inevitable that he would fail, because there were no changes to the overall structure of the NIS.” He continued, “The success of the reform depends on whether it can reduce the power of the NIS director, and for this, a fundamental paradigm shift is needed. They need to decide, whether to look at NIS reform as a blank slate or break the NIS into smaller units. ”

Experts point out the NIS’s intelligence functions need to be divided into a foreign intelligence agency, a North Korea intelligence agency and an anti-spy agency, and the NIS should only integrate and revise the intelligence collected from each agency. The United States operates an ‘intelligence community, so-called Director of National Intelligence (DNI) who has authority to revise and control all intelligence produced and gathered by 16 units, including the Central Intelligence Agency (foreign intelligence), the FBI (domestic intelligence), and Department of Homeland Security (anti-terrorism).

The NIS opposes the division of its functions by arguing that ‘integration is important for the efficiency of intelligence collection and analysis’. The same argument was made by the NIS during Roh’s administration. The only alternative NIS came up with at that time was “to trust the president and the NIS agents”.

A source with deep expertise in the NIS’s structure said on condition of anonymity, “The NIS is simply saying no for no’s sake”. He referred to it as merely an attempt to protect the organization. “Breaking up the organization can result in greater expertise within each sub-organization. Separating authority will inevitably come together with separating responsibilities for budget, organizational structure, and personnel, all of which the NIS Planning & Coordination Office is currently in charge of. Greater personnel and budget authority within each sub-organization level will then naturally diminish the power of NIS director.”

The creation of a National Intelligence Committee, which would report directly to the president and have the authority to control and manage the intelligence agencies’ planning and budgets, was discussed under President Roh during his time in power.

Another source who has worked for NIS until recently raised a pessimistic view of NIS restructuring by saying on condition of anonymity, “Despite division of authority and the creation of new sub-level organizations, the same people will do the same intelligence work. How the intelligence service is used is up to the President, so use of the NIS can vary from president to president. However, benchmarking the US system is worth considering”.

The NIS and the police are the two main collectors and distributors of domestic intelligence in South Korea. Some intelligence experts and the NIS argue, “If the NIS is forbidden from collecting domestic intelligence, then the Blue House - which obtains the intelligence from the NIS and the police by encouraging competition for domestic intelligence between them - can no longer compare the intelligence gathered by the two bodies, for it is unable to maintain the competition between the two. Also, it no longer has other means to compare and determine whether intelligence may be distorted or misguided”. In other words, they believe the quality of intelligence can be improved through crosschecking between the two organizations.

On the other hand, another source who used to work for the NIS, commented, “That argument does not make sense because the NIS does not have any other source that can crosscheck intelligence that is specifically related to North Korea. Yet the NIS has never mentioned this reasoning.” In other words, enhancing intelligence analysis can be sufficient to prevent potentially misguided or distorted intelligence.

It has been repeatedly pointed out that anti-espionage investigation authority at the NIS should be handed over to the prosecutors, police, or an investigative agency dedicated exclusively to that purpose. Jang Yu-sik, lawyer and director of Administrative Monitoring Center for ‘People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy’, said at a panel discussion on NIS reform, “The intelligence services work based on security and patrol due their unique tasks. Then, giving investigative authority to them would make it impossible for the public to monitor the investigative process. That would eventually lead to infringement on fundamental rights”.

There is plenty of temptation for Presidents

“A new idea is under discussion to prohibit intelligence agents from the NIS and other relevant organizations accessing the National Assembly. We are considering whether to utilize those human resources to instead enhance intelligence collection on North Korea or investigative function,” reported by the Chosun Ilbo on December 31, 2012.

The first preliminary plan for NIS reform was mentioned by the Presidential Transition Committee after Park Geun-hye was elected president in December 2012. However, the internal review was ultimately not completed.

According to one source who is responsible for intelligence at an inspection agency, “The idea of discontinuing intelligence agents’ access to the National Assembly was probably an abstract idea within the transition committee, before they actually received any intelligence reports from NIS. They must have changed their thoughts after becoming president and receiving daily reports from the NIS.” It means the intelligence report is highly recognized as it contains rare, critical information. It is therefore valuable and quite addictive.

A retired senior official who was in charge of domestic intelligence at the NIS said, “In the report that President receives every day, there are three to four significant pieces of intelligence that wouldn’t otherwise be known”. This is why the president’s ‘good will to use’ cannot work out, but will be continuously tested.

Yonsei University Professor Moon Chung-in who wrote ‘National Intelligence Principles’ - a must-read for prospective NIS applicants - was once nominated as chief of the NIS Reform Committee at the beginning of Roh’s presidency. Moon recently expressed his regret in his Joongang Ilbo column, saying, “When it comes to national security, it is meaningless to distinguish between domestic and foreign. This led to arguments that separating the domestic and foreign intelligence agencies would only result in two huge organizations. Hence, the committee was opposed to separating NIS into two agencies at that time. With much to regret, I think the reform should have pursued a strategy of separating the intelligence units, instead of maintaining their integrated state”.

Choi Kyung-hwan, Saenuri Party floor leader, recently said, “Although further internal discussions are required, the NIS should be made to return to its original role. Its focus needs to be limited to capturing spies and collecting intelligence from abroad and North Korea”.

The NIS Act Amendment Bill has been submitted to the National Assembly by Democratic Party lawmakers Jin Seong-joon, Jeong Cheong-rae, and Min Byeong-do.

　

Translated by Lee Dong-ju, Hankyoreh English Intern

　

Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]